Three Things We Learned From The Ceasefire In Gaza

 Jennifer Rubin (at The Contrarian) tells us three things we learned from the ceasefire in Gaza:

The end of fighting in Gaza and the return of the remaining 20 live Israeli hostages are cause for joy and celebration. But there is also grief—grief for those Israelis whose loved ones will return in body bags (if at all), grief for loved ones of Israeli soldiers killed in battle or who committed suicide after serving in an interminable war with unimaginable horrors, and the grief of thousands of Gazans whose loved ones were killed or maimed and whose lives have been reduced to rubble.

What can we learn from all this suffering, death, and destruction—as well as the joy that comes from reunification and even temporary peace?

First, Donald Trump is a consummate bully, and when a bully is called for, there is no equal. In this case, it was obvious that for months, if not a year, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was the obstacle to ending the war. We know that because when Trump finally badgered him into ending it following Israel’s assassination strike in Qatar, the war ended. No doubt annoyed that Trump’s Qatari friends (and airplane supplier) were hit, he finally decided to act.

In other words, an end to the war quite likely could have come much sooner had Netanyahu not been an impediment and Trump not been disengaged for so long. Understand that as long as Trump was offering unconditional support to Netanyahu and cheering on violence, the war dragged on. When he stopped, the war could end.

That leads to the second major lesson from this horrific event: Unconditional support for the Israeli government no matter how destructive and objectionable its behavior is counterproductive for both countries. Now that Trump and the MAGA right are willing to use pressure on the Israeli government, neither U.S. political party is likely to return to the posture of unconditional support. If Trump can get tough, why not Congress and every future president? The Israel right-or-wrong position that AIPAC, right-wing Christians, and some American Jews have held is no longer unassailable.

The adjustment in Israeli-U.S. relations is long overdue. We remain allied to Israel, as we do with other allies, because Israel has shared our strategic interests and democratic values. Once the latter is called into question, the relationship rightly changes—as it should with other countries (e.g., Venezuela, Turkey) that backslide on democracy.

Third, a real peace—e.g., complete Israeli withdrawal, a functional Arab government in Gaza, and a massive rebuilding—is exponentially more difficult to attain than the end of hostilities and the return of hostages. For one thing, it requires detailed, laborious negotiations for which Trump has no interest or capacity. One could easily see this dragging on for months.

And that brings us to Israel’s future. The current government might fall when budget negotiations flounder or Netanyahu’s government collapses over other issues (such as the military exemption for the ultra-orthodox). In any event, new elections must be called no later than next October. That might mean Netanyahu, forever playing to his base, has no incentive whatsoever to make progress on the remaining issues. Conversely, the Palestinians might rightly figure that a different Israeli government could be more willing to make an acceptable deal. In short, the chance of gridlock on the rest of the deal is high.